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1. Introduction
This work is the result of field research conducted between January and March 
2012 in the main palm oil producing region in Brazil, situated in the State of Pará and 
encompassing the municipalities of Moju, Tailândia and Acará. Its scope also included 
Belém, the state capital, where a company, after extracting the crude oil in the areas 
where palm is cultivated, refines the palm oil. Semi-structured questionnaires were ap-
plied to a number of stakeholders directly involved in the palm oil value chain, such as 
small producers, workers’ unions, suppliers, NGOs, and the state of Pará’s governmental 
agencies, as well as local authorities, namely the governments of the three municipalities 
where palm oil is cultivated.
This work has two main objectives: firstly, to highlight the influence of transnational 
arenas in the context of International Relations. It is well-known that the 21st century 
marks the emergence of non-State actors in a context where, traditionally, the State has 
exclusively exerted its sovereignty (Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Pattberg, 2005; Cafaggi et 
al., 2011). These actors set up arenas which are truly transnational, since decision-making 
processes involve the creation of standards and the implementation of agreements that 
are not under the control and influence of States and International Organizations (IOs) 
(Cashore, 2002; Büthe, 2010). In the case of palm oil, the transnational arena is defined 
by a multi-stakeholder initiative (Hale and Held, 2011), where adopted regulations are 
enforced through market incentives. Compliance is monitored through auditing and 
socioenvironmental certification schemes (Perosa, 2010). 
Secondly, this case study allows us to understand the relationship between the 
private sector and the influence it has on public policies in the domestic (national) 
sphere, through the corporate strategy of a company acting within the Palm Oil Sectorial 
Chamber. The public-private synergy, fruit of the leadership of public managers in con-
junction with that company, resulted in high socioenvironmental standards for palm oil 
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cultivation in Brazil. Since palm oil cultivation is associated with deforestation and the 
loss of biodiversity in Asia, this commodity’s main export and region of production, Brazil 
has stood out due to its control over palm oil cultivation in regions of native forest. At 
the same time, Brazilian environmental and social regulation strengthened the position 
of the company in the transnational arena that regulates the global palm oil market. Si-
milarly, it allowed the Brazilian company to develop a competitive strategy based on the 
adoption of labels and certifications that provide market access and ensure higher prices 
for the Brazilian palm oil. This overlapping between the ‘domestic’ and the international 
spheres fostered the projection of Brazil’s soft power through socioenvironmental regu-
lation and strengthened the Brazilian palm oil company in the commodity value chain, 
with the acknowledgement that vegetable oil production in Brazil not only respects the 
environment, but also the social and labor rights enshrined in the legislation.
Despite the apparent success of the Brazilian palm oil production, the current 
article highlights some important issues. Without real market power, how can the pro-
minent position of the Brazilian company be explained, if production costs are higher 
in Brazil? Why did this Brazilian company decide on a competitive strategy involving 
adherence to socioenvironmental standards? How did the synergy between its corporate 
strategy and the Brazilian government’s policy for promoting palm oil emerge, in view of 
the fact that palm is an alien commodity, with no cultivation tradition in Brazil? Section 
2 provides the bases for the arguments introduced here, while Section 3 discusses the 
competitiveness of the Brazilian palm oil. That is, how did this Brazilian company, with 
high production and logistics costs manage to compete in the international market? 
Section 4 discusses the impact of certifications and labels for palm oil production in 
Brazil and section 5 explores the relationship between public policy and the company’s 
corporate strategy, and how this public-private synergy has impacted the transnational 
arena.  Finally, Section 6 analyses how the Brazilian company influences the private 
transnational system for the global governance of palm oil, the RSPO (Round Table on 
Sustainable Palm Oil).
2. The argument
There is synergy between the Brazilian company’s corporate strategy for palm oil 
production and the public policy stimulating this strategy. Joint action on palm oil is pro-
moted by the government and non-state agents, establishing a space for bargaining and 
dialogue - a negotiation arena - the so-called Sectorial Chamber, set up in 2010 within 
the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA). From the government’s point of view, 
public policies to promote palm oil are an incentive to sustainable production, based on 
environmental regulation (and a ban on deforestation), in conjunction with social develo-
pment and the inclusion of small family-based growers. Governmental agencies provided 
scientific knowledge to underpin this public policy (EMBRAPAi and the INPAii). From 
the business sectors’ point of view, the work within the Sectorial Chamber was essential to 
establish the minimum socioenvironmental standards for production and trade, decided 
upon by the governmental agencies and other stakeholders.
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The synergy between the corporate strategy of the leading company and the ob-
jectives of public policy resulted in 1. High socioenvironmental standards for palm oil 
production in Brazil, where the company made use of certifications to ensure access to 
new foreign markets and to demand premium prices from clients sensitive to the world 
criticism against palm oil production; 2. The Federal Government has incentivized the 
production of palm oil as a mechanism to reduce deforestation in the Amazon forest 
and promote social inclusion. Other objectives are to make Brazil self-sufficient in this 
important input for the food industry, as is promoting biodiesel as an alternative energy 
source, given that palm oil is also used in its production; and 3. Through social inclusion 
and environmental and labor standards, the Federal Government and the company project 
a vision of Brazil as a country that assertively responds to criticisms about deforestation 
and the loss of biodiversity in the Amazon biome. 
It is worth highlighting that in the case of palm oil, there are no multilateral inter-
governmental regulationsiii. Global regulation/governance of this commodity occurs via 
a private institutional arrangement operating in the transnational arena, as is the case 
of the RSPO. As governments do not participate in the RSPO, it is the reputation of a 
company committed to practices that are environmentally and socially correct and respect 
labor legislation that projects the national government’s policies to Asian competitors. 
Given that, since the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian company’s corporate strategy has 
been to internalize the costs of adhering to Brazilian environmental, social and labor 
regulations, it ended up ‘lending’ its reputation to the RSPO, created primarily by Asian 
companies, traders and palm oil manufacturers with a ‘reputation deficit’, a result of the 
deforestation of tropical forests in its production chain.
At the same time, despite the fact that public-private synergy promotes the high 
levels of the Brazilian regulatory standards, it has no impact on the fact that production 
costs in the country are very high. The hypothesis expounded here is that Brazil ‘exports’ 
its domestic socioenvironmental regulation not through external policy (diplomacy), but 
via the commitments made by a Brazilian company at the RSPO. This is the result of 
the public-private synergy articulated among business leaders and public administrators 
within the Palm Oil Sectorial Chamber between 2010 and 2011. It reveals Brazil’s soft 
power (Nye Jr, 2004) as the socioenvironmental commitments assumed by the company 
in the country provides credibility or a positive reputation to the global production chain, 
constantly criticized due to the fact that palm cultivation occupies areas of tropical forest.
3. The competitiveness of Brazilian palm oil
Palm oil is the most produced and consumed vegetable oil in the world (Oil World, 
2012), with 80% of its production destined for the food sector and 20% for the chemical 
industry and the bioenergy and biofuel sectors. Palm oil also makes up 60% of the inter-
national trade in vegetable oils (idem). The global palm oil production is concentrated 
in tropical climate with high temperatures and rainfall rates. Palm oil originated in the 
West Coast of Africa, and its cultivation prospered in Asia, especially in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the two main producers. In these countries, a palm oil production model was 
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developed where small producers are integrated to processing and refining companies 
that receive strong governmental incentives. This model originated in Malaysia in the 
1960s and was later adopted by Indonesia and Thailand (Table 1).
Palm oil productivity depends on high temperatures and high rainfall. According to 
Embrapa’s agroecological zoning (2010), suitable areas for palm cultivation are found in 
the Amazon region and, to a lesser extent, the Northeast of Brazil. Traditionally, the state 
of Bahia dominated the production of dendê oil. Approximately 90% of national produc-
tion derives from the Amazon region, in particular the state of Pará, although there are 
isolated cultivation areas in the states of Amapá, Amazonas and Roraima. Given climate 
and soil conditions, the Brazilian Amazon region was targeted by the Federal Government 
in the form of incentives to palm production comprising funding lines, social inclusion 
programmes, as well as stricter social and environmental regulation.
The production of dendê oil and refined palm oil in Brazil represents less than 1% of 
the world’s production. The company responsible for almost 65% of Brazilian production 
has its headquarters in the state of Pará (2011). Table 1 shows Brazil in the eleventh posi-
tion, behind Asian countries, accounting for 80% of palm oil production, and Colombia, 
the largest producer in the Americas. Palm oil production is expanding across the world. 
With the exception of the two leading countries (Malaysia and Indonesia), there are five 
American countries among the main producers, with Colombia in the first place, well 
ahead of Ecuador, which in turn is ahead of Honduras, Costa Rica and Brazil. The latter 
produced 270,000 tonnes in 2011. Brazil imported an additional 214,000 tonnes of palm 
oil and palm kernel oil in the same year. This means that Brazil is a net importer since 
it produces approximately half of its consumption needs. In 2011, the leading Brazilian 
company produced approximately 176,000 tonnes of palm oil and palm kernel oil. That 
is, approximately 0.35% of world production, 65% of the Brazilian production and 34.5% 
of the sales in the country. 
Table 1: Palm Oil: World production (1000t), 2009-2011
Country Harvest 2009 2010 2011
Indonesia Jan-Dec 21000 22100 24100
Malaysia Jan-Dec 17566 16993 18912
Thailand Jan-Dec 1310 1380 1530
Colombia Jan-Dec 802 753 941
Nigeria Jan-Dec 870 885 930
Papua New Guinea Jan-Dec 478 500 520
Ecuador Jan-Dec 429 380 495
Ivory Coast Jan-Dec 345 330 400
Honduras Jan-Dec 280 275 320
Brazil Jan-Dec 240 250 270
Cameroon Jan-Dec 238 250 254
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Costa Rica Jan-Dec 220 230 250
WORLD TOTAL  45265 45829 50518
Source: Oil World, 2012.
It is important to consider that oil palms demand intensive labor. They are pro-
duced in a system involving the integration of production chains with social inclusion 
programmes and/or corporate policies and actions. Despite governmental incentives for 
social inclusion, production costs associated with labor and environmental regulations in 
Brazil represent 40% of the final costs of the crude oil production (data from the leader 
company). In addition to production costs, there are logistics and shipping costs, as well 
as taxes on the refined product. The inevitable conclusion is that the Brazilian refined 
palm oil cannot compete with the Asian product in the international market (Table 2). 
The Brazilian company’s production costs for crude oil are between US$720.00 
and US$750.00, that is, twice as much as crude oil extraction costs in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the two main palm oil producers (respectively U$400.00 and US$ 300.00, 
2012 data). The price of CIF Rotterdam crude oil (including freight and insurance), the 
best indicator of palm oil price, was around US$1.060/toniv in 2012. Therefore, when 
analysing the gross margins of palm oil processing companies before the refining and 
production of the various derivatives, it can be observed that crude palm oil in Brazil is 
twice as expensive as in Asia.
Table 2: Palm Oil Production Costs (in US$ per ton)
Country Malaysia Indonesia Brazil*
Cost 400.00 (2012) 300.00 (2012) 720.00 – 750.00 **
Price CIF Rotterdam 1060.00***
Margin (660.00) (760. 00) 321.00 – 291.00
*Figures provided by the Brazilian company in November 2012;
**Variation is due to seasonal factors;
***Corresponds to the price per ton of CIF Rotterdam crude oil in January 2012.
Source: leading company
In terms of transport, logistics and tax costs, Brazilian palm oil is even less com-
petitive when compared to the Asian product. According to the working group on 
taxation in the Palm Oil Sectorial Chamber, the freight for transporting refined oil and 
taxes (ICMS and Pis/Cofinsv) and binding contributions are the two factors reducing the 
competitiveness of this commodity in Brazil. Transporting palm oil from Pará for refining 
and distribution in the main consumer centres, in the Southeastern region, is more 
expensive than importing Asian oil and distributing it in São Paulo, through the Port of 
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Santos. Thus, even with import taxes at 10%, the Brazilian palm oil is taxed at source 
(12% ICMS, for Pará), whereas oil imported from Oceania, if it is refined in Paraná, is 
only taxed 3% ICMS (or 7% in São Paulo). Pis/Cofins rates remain the same (9.25%), but 
the calculation base is higher for national palm oil (Table 3). Given the lack of taxation 
parity, the Sectorial Chamber working group suggests the creation of a label, the “Social 
Palm Oil label”, exempting it from Pis/Cofins.
Table 3: The Brazilian Palm Oil Logistics and Transport Costs
Cost Breakdown
Value (in R$ - average price 2010)
Imported* National
FOB price 1,485.80 1,718.75
International freight and insurance 124.14 0
SUBTOTAL 1,609.94 1,718.75
Import Taxes (II) 160.99 0
ICMS 146.67 300.00
PIS/COFINS 177.79 231.25
Customs costs 43.00 0
Freight
60.00 (port of Santos – 
São Paulo)
250.00 (Belém – São Paulo)
Price per ton of palm oil sold in São Paulo 2,198.39 2,500.00
Source: MAPA, Palm Oil Sectorial Chamber.
*Exchange rate in 09/05/2011(US$ 1= R$ 1.615)
With such high production costs, how is it possible for Brazil to compete with 
Asian countries? Why did Brazil launch a public policy to stimulate the cultivation of 
this crop in the country? Despite the merits of a social inclusion policy and the upscaling 
of environmental regulation, it could be counterproductive to offer incentives for a crop 
which does not provide comparative advantages for Brazil, differently from soy, maize 
or ethanol, whose costs are counterbalanced by the high levels of productivity of the 
Brazilian agribusiness.
In the academic literature there is a fine line drawn between the so-called tra-
ditional domestic arena and international policy. Büthe and Mattli (2011) argue that 
synergy between public policies and the competitive strategies of a sector/company, and 
the resulting transnational policy, depends on institutional complementarity between the 
domestic and international spheres. The RSPO, as a multi-stakeholder initiative, promo-
tes governance and the regulation of the palm oil production chain and is the result of 
synergies among governments and the private sector in countries where the absence of 
international regulations imposes high distributional costs. In the absence of IOs regu-
lation, it is up to private actors to define the minimum level of accepted commitments 
by the market. That is, the socioenvironmental rules that guarantee production/export 
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from the main producing countries. If Brazil was a large producer/exporter of palm oil, 
the above argument would be adequate, that is, a case of transnational private regulation 
where market agents define the regulatory framework and promote governance.
However, Brazil is not a large player in the global palm oil market. One Brazilian 
company is responsible for 65% of national production and 34.5% of national sales and 
it operates in an environment where, nationally, almost 50% of palm oil is imported. One 
of the ways this company found to address its lack of power in the market was to adhere 
to higher socioenvironmental standards and to compete in niches, providing services to 
more demanding clients concerned with the negative reputation of palm oil production. 
The following section explains, from the private sector point of view, the reasons why 
Brazil became a more prominent player.
4. Corporate Strategy and Socioenvironmental Standards
Economic sociology suggests that the private sector’s new forms of value chain are 
a reaction to pressures on the global civil society to promote environmental protection 
and development in poor countries (Gereffi et al., 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Cashore 
and Bernstein, 2007). Regulatory demands are incorporated by companies which begin 
to operate according to a political agenda that forces them to make commitments and 
internalize socioenvironmental standards. This movement brings the private sector closer 
to other stakeholders acting outside the target activities of the company, as well as invol-
ving them in public policies to promote social inclusion and environmental preservation 
(Perosa, 2010; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).
The activities of the Brazilian palm oil company in the Amazon region began with 
fiscal incentives provided by Sudamvi to attract investments to the region in the 1980s. 
The company was then called Crai (Real Agroindustrial Company) and it started its ope-
rations at the beginning of the 1980s in an area encompassing 5,000 hectares where the 
first oil palm seeds were planted. In 1997, in Belém, the group opened its first crude oil 
refinery and, at the beginning of the 2000s, production expanded to higher value-added 
derivatives such as vegetable creams and ingredients/input for the food industry in the 
form of fats and margarines (Marcovitch, 2011:108).
The company’s main activity is to produce crude palm oil and palm kernel oil, as 
well as other derivatives. Between 30% and 40% of the production is destined for niche 
markets demanding higher standards and different characteristics. They are corporate 
clients in the Brazilian food and cosmetic industries such as Yoki (General Mills), Uni-
lever (ice creams), Ferrero Rocher (chocolats), Nestlé (ice creams), Natura (the Ekos 
line) and Cargill (soy).
In contrast to their Asian competitors, the Brazilian company anticipated the im-
pacts of global civil society pressure on palm oil cultivation as early as the 1990s. Accor-
ding to one of the company’s directors, palm oil operations in the Amazon region would 
not have been feasible without a commitment to social and environmental legislation 
requirements. In particular, the Forestry Code and environmental licensing. They also 
had to show a commitment to the legalization (property rights) of cultivation areas. The 
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company director reiterates that the firm does not cultivate oil palms in areas without 
the appropriate documentation as required by law. 
During the field research in the first quarter of 2012, the company produced appro-
ximately 176,000 tonnesvii. According to the accounts gathered by researchers, this firm 
is recognised by the government, NGOs and local unions as a company that internalizes 
the negative social and environmental impacts of cultivating and refining palm oil in the 
country. All union leaders interviewed representing rural workers in Moju, Acará, and 
Tailândia were unanimous in acknowledging the company’s good reputation in terms of its 
compliance with Brazilian labour laws, as well as Fetagri (Pará Federation of Agricultural 
Workers), whose leaders were interviewed in Belém. 
In the case of environmental NGOs, based in Belém, and the State of Pará’s Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, there was some questioning of the environmental impacts of this 
monoculture in the Amazon region; the business model based on large rural properties; 
some of the aspects associated with the exclusive contracts signed between rural smal-
lholders and the company; and the smallholders’ almost exclusive commitment to oil 
palm cultivation - in particular during the trees’ first three years of life. For some, these 
demands were considered a threat to the food security of rural workersviii.
During the 2000s the company obtained 12 certifications and labels issued by go-
vernments and private organizations, associated with factors such as socioenvironmental 
attributes, organic farming and quality standards related to environmental management. 
As the literature shows, the strategy pursued by the company can be classified in different 
ways:
a) Preventive ‘Prevention’ theories point to the anticipation of a trend in the private 
sector so as to avoid or delay top-down public regulation, which would involve greater 
operational costs, given that companies will eventually have to compulsorily adopt these 
rules (Gereffi et al., 2005);
b) Diversification It guarantees access to niche markets such as those of organic and 
Kosher products and demonstrates a company’s commitment through the diversification 
of its product portfolio; ‘club theory’ explains the behaviour of companies that share goods 
and have a restricted access and unlimited consumption, as in the case of certifications 
and labels, that is, ‘club’ goods (Prakash and Potoski, 2010);
c) Entry barriers Socio-environmental regulation that is hard to comply with creates 
an entry barrier for foreign companies that may want to enter the Brazilian market. As 
this company is a leader in Brazil, its commitment to labels and certifications signals to 
newcomers the higher entry costs (Porter, 2004).
Labels and certifications adopted by the Brazilian company have different attri-
butes and scopes in relation to the local or global spheres. They also vary in terms of the 
institutional profile of organizations issuing instruments and third parties monitoring 
and validating adherence to the criteria and indicators verified (compliance). Thus, the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of labels and certification varies.
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Chart 1: Labels and Certifications obtained by the Brazilian palm oil company
Certification Area Profile
Round Table on 
Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO)
.
Environmental
Labor
Certification approved and verified by an independent 
third party. The production process is assessed according 
to 8 principles,39 criteria, involving over 120 indicators 
addressing environmental, technical, economic, social and 
labour standards, as well as business best practices.  
ISO 9001 Quality
This certification assesses ‘quality’ and was produced by 
ISO (International Organization for Standardization); it is 
internalized by the company’s management.
ISO 14001
.
Environmental 
Management
Environmental management certification, issued by ISO. 
Its aim is to minimise the environmental impact of the 
production process and force the company to comply with 
legislation. This certification is issued to each production 
unit and not to the company as a whole.
ISO 22000 Quality
Food safety management certification. Standard created 
by ISO. The company’s certified units are the refinery, the 
vegetable fat and margarine processing unit, as well as the 
commercial office.
OHSAS 18001 Social
This certification regulates health and safety standards in 
the workplace at all stages of the production process based 
on local/national and international regulations so as to 
reduce occupational illnesses and accidents at work. 
EcoSocial
.
Environmental 
Social
Fair Trade and organic food certification promoting local 
socioenvironmental development. IBD Certifications 
monitors and issues this certification. 
Organic Label Organic
Organic certification based on the Brazilian regulatory 
framework and standards recognised by IBD 
Certifications, an institution accredited by IFOAM 
(International Foundation for Organic Agriculture).
BioSuisse Organic
Label issued by the Swiss Federation of Organic Producers, 
a private association operating under rigorous codes for 
producing, processing and importing food.
Japanese Agriculture 
Standard
Organic
Organic Certification issued by Japan’s Department of 
Agriculture, based on specific food legislation.
Ambiente & Sociedade  n  São Paulo v. XIX, n. 4  n  p. 1-20  n out.-dez. 2016  
10 Veiga and Rodrigues
United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture
Organic
United States’ Department of Agriculture Certification 
and programme for organic food, based on this country’s 
legislation. 
Korean Certified
Organic
Organic
The Korean regulatory agency’s certification for food based 
on standards defined by the Korean government. 
Kosher Organic, Quality
Certification based on religious standards that identifies food 
produced according to 2regulation established by the Jewish 
religion, based on the kashrut.
Source: Sheppe et al., Columbia University, 2012.
Certification schemes allow the company to access new markets and clients and 
obtain higher prices for higher added-value products. Prices vary between 10% and 
15% above those in the commodities and futures marketix and 30% of the company’s 
production and almost 100% of its palm oil exports go to clients that demand labels and 
certificates. In the case of organics, prices vary between 40% and 50% of the price of the 
conventional product. 
A further aim of this aggressive policy of adhering to certification and labels is to 
reduce operational risks in a complex and sensitive biome such as the Amazon forest. By 
internalizing environmental and social costs and by seeking a more expressive share of 
the market in the production of refined oil, the Brazilian company establishes a ‘model’ of 
production in the north region of Brazil that cannot be disregarded by Asian newcomers, 
if they wish to compete with this leading Brazilian firm.
However, this strategy is worthless if it is not accompanied by policies that produce 
a regulatory framework to project the image of the company and, at the same time, put 
in place obstacles to the entry of new competitors. Socioenvironmental regulation does 
both, it boosts the reputation of the company and acts as an entry barrier in the market 
(Porter, 2004). This corroborates the arguments expounded by Büthe and Mattli (2011). 
In order to have institutional complementarity between the domestic and international 
spheres both the government and the private sector must adhere to socioenvironmental 
regulation at the domestic level. If only governments are involved, the result would be 
a new multilateral, international, intra-governmental agreement. If only the companies 
created rules, the result would be global self-regulation.
5. Public policy and palm oil production in the Brazilian Amazon region
The Palm Oil Sectorial Chamber was set up by MAPA based on the 2010 Decree-
-Law that institutionalized the policy that regulates the whole palm oil production chain 
in the country. The leading company has been an active member of the Sectorial Chamber 
since its first formal meetings and is able to influence the topical agenda and policy prio-
rities for the sector. As already highlighted, this is not a case of traditional rent-seeking 
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behaviour. It is also not the case that the government decided to have a ‘national cham-
pion’. In Brazil, refined palm oil production at the industrial scale is recent, and it is almost 
entirely located in the state of Pará, a state known for land conflicts, deforestation due 
to cattle farming, as well as the presence of big businesses in other agribusiness sectors, 
mining and large hydropower plants projects.
To change these adverse conditions, the Brazilian government launched a program 
to define a positive agenda to counteract controversies involving palm oil in the Amazon 
biome. Known as the “Program for the Sustainable Production of Palm Oil in Brazil” its 
main objective is to regulate the expansion of palm cultivation so it is socially and en-
vironmentally sustainable. The obvious concern with the preservation of the forest led 
EMBRAPA to develop ecological agro-zoning, banning deforestation of the native forest 
and restricting cultivation areas to 31.8 million hectares (from a potential 232.8 million). 
The programme provides incentives in the shape of technical assistance to families (via 
Ematerx), funding by the PRONAF-Ecoxi (PROFLORA and PRODUSA, both for produ-
cers and cooperatives) programme for cultivation in collective settlement areas, as well 
as rural credits through the investment banks (Banco do Brasil and Banco da Amazônia).
Areas defined by Embrapa’s ecological agro-zoning used criteria such as land use, 
rainfall rate and average temperature for the cultivation of the crop. It also bans cultiva-
tion in indigenous, quilombola (former slave settlements) and forest reserves. Thus, this 
policy identifies suitable areas for production, according to the criteria defined by Embrapa. 
Results point to the state of Pará as offering the best conditions for productionxii. Of the 
eight states comprising the Amazon Region, Pará has the largest number of municipalities 
that meet the established criteria. Approximately120 of the state’s 143 municipalities 
are entitled to cultivate palm. It is worth highlighting, however, that this study does not 
consider which areas are highly suitable, suitable or not fully suitable. It only considers 
generic suitability. It is up to the investor to analyze other issues associated to the region’s 
micro-climate, which can be highly variable in the Amazon biome.
Although governmental policies for the cultivation of palm seem to point to a 
clear division between the role of governmental agencies and the private sector, it is the 
definition of the Sectorial Chamber’s agenda that reveals this company’s influence over 
governmental actions. Decree-Law 7.172 (07/05/2010) approved agroecological zoning 
and defined regulation regarding funding operations, whilst Ordinance 592 (MAPA) cre-
ated the Palm Oil Sectorial Chamber, instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) 
in partnership with the private sector. 
During the first Sectorial Chamber meeting, the company’s director was responsi-
ble for presenting the main challenges to the palm oil production chain in Brazil, a clear 
sign of agenda setting. That is, the company defined the priorities by negotiating with 
the government. During the second meeting, the leader company’s delegate was the only 
private sector representative to talk and, at that time, expressed a position that palm oil 
policy had been developed by “many hands” and its success was due to the commitment 
of the authorities and the private sector’s engagement with the proposed aims. The leader 
company was also the only one to develop a partnership with Embrapa to promote research 
and development initiatives to improve the genetic material of oil palm hybrids so as to 
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avoid bud rot, the main disease affecting the palm crop. This new hybrid was announced 
during the second meeting of the Sectorial Chamber, in which former President Lula was 
present, clearly lending his personal prestige to all members. The former president’s pre-
sence was seen as an indication that this policy provided positive results, along with the 
engagement of the private sector in partnership with a governmental agency (Embrapa).
During the third meeting in May 2011, Conabxiii presented preliminary data on 
palm oil production and planted area for 2010. The company’s representative questioned 
whether the area comprising 72,000 hectares of crop. Still in its developmental stages, 
and the 57,000 hectares of fruit bearing crop were in fact under-estimated. Indeed, the 
numbers presented by Conab were dismissed by the members of the Chamber and the 
numbers brought forward by the leading company were used to define land regulariza-
tion actions as set out by this policy. Land regularization involved another governmental 
agency, Incraxiv - the National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform - not 
present in all the Sectorial Chamber’s meetings, but whose main initiatives and policies 
were fundamental in order to get palm oil cultivation with the integration of family-based 
agriculture (PRONAF-Eco) off the ground. 
The land regularization programme was set up during the fourth meeting of the 
Chamber and involved mainly areas in the state of Pará. During the same meeting, the 
leading company formally presented a management system for palm oil pest and disease 
control, and the ‘integrated’ production model was officially presented by MAPAxv. During 
the last meeting in 2011 (October), members discussed strategic planning for palm oil 
production in Brazil for the next decade. At the time, the company expressed its con-
cern with the importation of palm oil, stimulated by the disparity between the taxation 
regimes of different Brazilian states. As the state of Pará has the highest palm oil ICMS, 
importers bring commodities to other states where taxation is lower, negatively impacting 
local palm oil producers in Pará.
In each Sectorial Chamber meeting, the company behaved as a strategic actor and 
constructed, together with governmental agencies, a policy for palm oil in Brazil. As we 
have seen, there is sufficient empirical evidence of its prominent role, and a further sign 
of this is the fact that this firm is the only one with appropriate technical expertise. It also 
has a competitive strategy to operate in the vegetable oil segment in the international 
market for food industry raw materials. This company was also the only one to participate 
in all five Sectorial Chamber meetings (between 2010 and 2011) and  was always in a 
position to define the sectorial agenda, addressing, in particular, three main concerns: 
1. Logistics and regulatory challenges to the competitiveness of palm oil production in 
Brazil; 2. Research and Development in biotechnology to improve the genetic material 
of oil palm hybrids; and 3. Parity in the taxation regime between the different Brazilian 
states that produce and refine palm oil so as to promote domestic production and, in this 
way, strengthen the palm oil value chain in Brazil.
The governmental programme to promote palm oil - funding policies for producers 
and family farmers, ecological agro-zoning, and the Sectorial Chamber - promoted the 
synergy between the government and the Brazilian company’s corporate strategy, based 
on social and environmental certifications and labels. This corroborates the theory of 
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Büthe and Mattli (2011) on institutional complementarity between the domestic and 
international spheres. The result is the creation of a private transnational arena whe-
re market agents act whilst being indirectly based on public regulation. In the case of 
Brazil, public policy and socioenvironmental regulation project the country’s soft power 
and ensure the position of the Brazilian company in the RSPO, despite lacking market 
power - the production of the Brazilian company is equivalent to less than 0.5% of global 
palm oil production.
6. The private transnational arena - RSPO
The specialized literature points to the importance of non-State agents in deve-
loping governance and regulation instruments for some commodity chains outside the 
scope of States and International Organizations (Cashore, 2002; Büthe, 2010; Held and 
Hale, 2011). Indeed, the object of this study does not involve the direct participation of 
governments and formal international organizations. The so-called multi-stakeholder 
initiatives are negotiation arenas set up to organise production and trading between 
the different parties of the main producing and consuming countries such as the Better 
Cotton Initiative for cotton, Bonsucro for sugar and ethanol, RTRS (Round Table on 
Responsible Soy) for soy and RSPO for palm oil (Held and Hale, 2011). 
For some authors, this is a sign of ‘privatization’ of the international authority and 
the decline of the sovereign State. For others, it is a new ‘division of labor’ promoted by 
the reduction of transaction costs (Gilligan, 2009), and with the delegation of the au-
thority of States and IOs to private organizations (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Büthe and 
Mattli, 2011). In fact, orchestration theorists (Abbott and Snidal, 2009) and those that 
believe in institutional complementarity (Büthe and Mattli, 2011) are concerned with the 
efficacy of cooperation and so-called ‘focal point’ authority, that is, without competitors. 
Market agents operate in the shadow of States (Börzel and Risse, 2010) because they 
indirectly incorporate the regulatory framework of governments where the main players 
in the global production chain are based. Governments use this as a means to indirectly 
project their influence on the political arenas occupied by non-State actors.
There are many examples. In the case of labor regulation, all multi-stakeholder 
initiatives refer to the so-called core labor standards, or fundamental labor rights as de-
fined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1998). In the case of Bonsucro, a 
substantial number of standards relate to European directives for biofuels. The RSPO and 
the RTRS recognise the environmental legislation of their main stakeholders’ countries 
of origin.
Indeed, multi-stakeholder initiatives are private because market incentives drive 
the participation of actors, such as those that react to a commodity’s global supply, the ac-
credited organisations that conduct auditing and issue certifications, as well as consumers. 
There is still room for institutional creation, where there are no pre-established rules for 
the membership of political representation in transnational arenas, or when there are no 
previously established decision-making processes, as is the case of international regimes 
and multilateral intergovernmental arenas. Thus, actors who are directly involved in the 
Ambiente & Sociedade  n  São Paulo v. XIX, n. 4  n  p. 1-20  n out.-dez. 2016  
14 Veiga and Rodrigues
value chain - producers, processers, traders, civil society and financial institutions - are 
always called upon when regulation is created. 
Oil palm is one of the most controversial crops due to its environmental impacts. 
Various ONGs developed a number of campaigns and reports questioning the sustainability 
of the oil palm crop, in particular, its association to deforestation and the loss of biodi-
versity in tropical forest areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America. WWF and Greenpeace 
promoted a number of campaigns to make consumers aware of food products from large 
brands such as Nestlé and Unilever that buy palm oil through their supply chains.  It 
was precisely due to the reaction of global civil society that WWF, in cooperation with 
multinational companies, started a discussion on the minimum standards that should be 
internalized by the value chains of all palm oil producing countries.
In 2002, an informal committee was set up, and in 2003 discussions started on the 
creation of an instrument to regulate the palm oil supply chain through transnational 
governance and regulation. This committee involved nearly 200 participants from 16 
countries. At the end of this process, a private transnational arrangement was formally 
established in 2004 with headquarters in Zurich (Switzerland), and a General-Secretariat 
in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). In comparison with other multi-stakeholder initiatives, the 
RSPO has the largest number of interested parties: a total of 712 across the entire value 
chain (Table 6). According to RSPO participants, approximately 14% of the global palm 
oil supply received the RSPO certification, that is, approximately 7 million in a global 
market of 50 million tonnes. The Brazilian leading company is the only one that has an 
RSPO certification issued by an accredited institution in Brazilxvi.
Table 4: Distribution of members between the various transnational arrangements
Private 
Transnational 
Arrangement
Type of Member
Civil Society Producers Distributors Others*
BONSUCRO
(62)
4 24 12 
22 + IFC (IBRD)** and 
Rabobank
BCI
(165)
10 9 23 123
RTRS
(118)
16 29 73
RSPO
(712)
30 388 +10 banks
Source: BONSUCRO (Global Sugarcane Platform), BCI (Better Cotton Initiative), RTRS (Round Table on 
Responsible Soy), RSPO (accessed on 04 December 2013)
* Suppliers, traders, processors, banks
** International Finance Corporation (IFC) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD)
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The Brazilian company is considered a ‘leader’ in Latin America, and the certifi-
cation obtained in 2011 was welcomed by the RSPO Secretary-General, Darrel Webber, 
as an important incentive to the sustainable production of palm oil and an example that 
should be followed by other companies across the world. The sustainability director of the 
Brazilian company claimed that the certification was a “new paradigm” for Brazilian palm 
production in a sensitive biome, as is the case of the Amazon region. A representative of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Denilson Ferreira, also said that the company’s certification 
is an “historical gain” for the Brazilian agribusiness (rspo.com, accessed on 26/04/2013). 
7. Conclusion
The salient position attained by the Brazilian company in the RSPO does not 
only depend on a corporate strategy aligned to social and environmental standards. The 
reputation of the Brazilian firm is the result of a synergetic alliance between public po-
licies for palm oil and the relationship built between the company and government and 
direct administration agencies in Brazil. Indeed, this synergy is based on public domestic 
regulation, driving the company’s operations in the transnational sphere. These are regu-
lations on the agro-zoning of areas for oil palm cultivation, social inclusion programmes 
and production incentive credits, as well as environmental legislation that have projected 
Brazil in the international market. Compliance with the Brazilian legislation, considered 
rigid in comparison to that of Asian countries, transforms the Brazilian company into a 
Latin American leader. 
The synergy between the Brazilian company and the government is based on two 
fundamental pillars. First, it is clear that the Brazilian company lends its reputation to a 
sector that is severely criticized by the global civil society through NGOs and social mo-
vements, with the pursuit of a corporate strategy based on complying with environmental 
and labour legislation since the 1990s. The apex of this process is the RSPO certification 
obtained by the company in August 2011. Despite the fact that Brazil has only six members 
in the RSPO, the performance of the Brazilian company is recognized and valued in the 
agribusiness sector in which it operates where, in general, standards are lower than those 
established by RSPO. This recognition can be seen, for example, in the participation of 
the “rest of the world” in the RSPO Executive Board.
At the same time, the Brazilian company does not intend to directly compete with 
the Asian companies in the international palm oil market. Its aim is to occupy market 
niches, where a premium is paid for certified products, and obtain gains in terms of repu-
tation, in order to access new markets in the vegetable fat derivatives segment. Brazilian 
corporate clients are the company’s main target, because it can provide customised 
products, despite Brazil’s higher transport and distribution costs.   
The second pillar, from the governmental perspective, shows that to be able to 
project a high level of social and environmental protection is an important asset for 
emerging economies, like Brazil. As a member of the BRICS, it is a strong demonstration 
of Brazil’s vibrant soft power (Nye Jr., 2004), recognized in the field of social policies and 
social inclusion. At the same time, Brazil promotes social changes and environmental 
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preservation through standards considered to be high by the international community 
and indirectly participates in private transnational arenas by strengthening Brazilian 
companies in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the RSPO.
Notes
i Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA).
ii Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE).
iii As is the case with coffee and cocoa, both commodities are regulated by dedicated formal international organizations 
(ICO – International Coffee Organization and ICCO – International Cocoa Organization, respectively).
iv According to Dow Jones News Wires, January 2012.
v Tax on Merchandise and Services Circulation (Imposto sobre a Circulação de Bens e Serviços), Program on Social 
Integration (Programa de Integração Social) and Contribution for Social Security Funding (Contribuição para o 
Financiamento da Seguridade Social).
vi Regulatory body for the sustainable development of Amazônia (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento da Amazônia 
– SUDAM) under the authority of Ministry of National Integration (Ministério da Integração Nacional).
vii 160,000 of refined palm oil and 16,000 of palm kernel oil.
viii Data from the Interview with prosecutors in the Belem, march, 2012.
ix The price range is different for crude oil, refined and fractionated products.
x State Agency for Technical Assistance in Rural Extension (Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural).
xi National Program for Familiar Agriculture (PRONAF) with compliance on environmental standards.
xii Ministry of Agriculture: Ordinance 416, 2010.
xiii National Supply Company (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento).
xiv National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional para a Colonização e Reforma Agrária).
xv Interview with Sidney Medeiros.
xvi IBD certifications, the certification was issued in August 2011 and is valid for five years.
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Abstract: This paper discusses the emergence of non-state actors involved in developing 
rules on environmental and social standards in transnational arenas that are outside the 
control of governments and International Organizations. This work is the result of a field 
research conducted between January and March 2012 in the main palm producing region 
of Brazil, located in the state of Pará, encompassing the municipalities of Moju, Tailândia 
and Acará. It comprises a case study of a palm oil producing company based in the Amazon 
region. The synergy of this company with governmental policy has projected Brazil’s soft 
power, not through foreign policy and diplomacy but by influencing transnational private 
regulation with the use of labels and certification schemes recognized by stakeholders 
engaged in the palm oil global chain. The authors use the academic literature on regu-
lation and private governance to highlight the rise of non-state actors as rule-makers in 
contemporary international relations.
Keywords: Environmental Standards, Palm Oil, Public Policy, Certification, Regulation.
Resumo: O artigo discute a ascensão de atores não estatais na produção de regras e nor-
mas ambientais e sociais em arenas transnacionais que escapam ao controle de governos e 
Organizações Internacionais. O presente trabalho é resultado de uma pesquisa de campo 
realizada na principal região produtora de palma do Brasil, entre janeiro e março de 2012, 
localizada no Estado do Pará - municípios de Moju, Tailândia, e Acará. Trata-se de um 
estudo de caso de uma empresa produtora de óleo de palma na Amazônia cuja sinergia 
com as políticas públicas acaba projetando o soft Power brasileiro, não através da política 
externa e da diplomacia, mas influenciando a regulação transnacional privada através de 
selos e certificados socioambientais, reconhecidos pelos stakeholders presentes na cadeia 
produtiva da commodity. Utiliza-se a literatura acadêmica sobre regulação e governança 
privada para realçar a ascensão de atores não estatais como produtores de regras nas relações 
internacionais contemporâneas.
Palavras-chave: Padrões Ambientais, Óleo de Palma, Política Pública, Certificação, Re-
gulação.
TRANSNATIONAL ARENAS, PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
THE CASE OF PALM IN THE AMAZON
JOÃO PAULO CÂNDIA VEIGA 
PIETRO CARLOS RODRIGUES
Resumen: Este documento analiza el surgimiento de actores no estatales involucrados en 
la elaboración de normas ambientales y sociales en espacios transnacionales que están 
fuera del control de los gobiernos y las organizaciones internacionales. Este trabajo es el 
resultado de una investigación de campo en la principal región productora de palma en 
Brasil, ubicada en el estado de Pará. Se compone de un estudio de caso de una empresa 
productora de aceite de palma con sede en la región amazónica. La sinergia de esta empresa 
con la política gubernamental ha proyectado el poder blando del Brasil por influencia de 
regulación privada transnacional con el uso de los esquemas de certificación reconocidos 
por los actores involucrados en la cadena mundial de aceite de palma. Los autores utilizan 
la literatura académica sobre regulación privada para resaltar el surgimiento de actores no 
estatales em las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas.
Keywords: normas ambientales, aceite de palma, política pública, certificación, reglamento.
